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Abstract. Models have proven themselves to be the key catalyst of many new 
ideas in science. However, it is not yet fully clarified why models can fulfill 
such an important heuristic role. The two main reasons stated in the literature –  
the mental simulation of various scenarios and the wide cross-fertilization 
across various disciplines – seem to leave out one of the most obvious features 
of models: they are designed for a purpose. Therefore I investigated why, while 
the construction of models is a goal-oriented task with a predefined purpose, the 
use of models yields so many new ideas in science. This paper presents my 
conceptual analysis together with a detailed historical case study. 
 
The functional design of models forces scientists to explore vigorously older 
ideas to adapt them: as the lacunas in a functional model are also functional, 
scientists need to modify older ideas (that were formulated for different purpos-
es) to fit the present functional gaps in their models. As such, they construct 
new ideas. The detailed historical case study exemplifies this by showing how 
Pauli’s original suggestion of the neutrino was, in fact, such an adaptation of 
Rutherford’s earlier idea of the neutron. The present analysis and case study 
suggest that functional adaptations are salient but often overlooked features of 
model based investigation. 
1 Introduction 
Models perform an important heuristic role in scientific investigation (Redhead 
1980, Morgan and Morrison 1999). Their success in this role is typically explained by 
two widespread practices. On the one hand, because of their dynamic nature, models 
allow to explore extensively and to experiment mentally with existing theories. As 
such, one can simulate various scenarios, and identify and mediate lacunas and anom-
alies in a given theory (Morgan and Morrison 1999, p. 19; Nersessian 2008, p. 185). 
On the other hand, models can be extremely fruitful.  Many simple abstract models 
have been applied to a variety of contexts outside their original field, a process that 
has led to a huge interdisciplinary cross-pollination.
1
 This shows that scientists are 
actively looking for useful models that can be applied to problems in their own field. 
In this paper, I want to add a third important heuristic practice involving models. 
Models have a typical functional structure or, to put it in other words, they are de-
signed with a purpose in mind. This means that lacunas or gaps in a model are by 
definition also functional, which invites the designer to actively explore old ideas that 
might serve to fill these gaps. 
The aim of this paper is to explicate and illustrate this third practice and its relation 
to the other two by presenting a case study of a famous idea in the history of modern 
physics, i.e. Pauli’s original suggestion in 1930 of the particle that was named the 
neutrino afterwards. In Gauderis 2013, I have argued that this idea was not so original 
as Pauli might have thought it to be, but can be seen as an adaptation of Rutherford’s 
original idea of the neutron in 1920. In this paper, I will further substantiate this claim 
by explicating both the problems that Rutherford and Pauli were working on, as well 
as the models they employed for their purposes. This analysis will interpret this histo-
ry as an example of how an idea that arose in a certain program managed to stay alive, 
even though the program grew obsolete, in order to be picked up ten years later as the 
missing piece in a model for another and much more prominent puzzle in the field. 
In the next section, I will start by expanding on the role of models in scientific dis-
covery, and show how the three heuristic practices identified above can be understood 
in generic terms, although the scope of this analysis will be restricted to the heuristic 
use of models in physics. The main objective of this section is to provide us with a 
conceptual framework to analyze the case study, which naturally falls apart into two 
distinct parts: Rutherford’s reasoning and models in 1920 and Pauli’s reasoning in 
1930, each of them being discussed in a separate section.  
2 Models and Scientific Discovery in Physics 
As some scholars have noticed, it is very hard to give a precise definition of a 
model, even if we restrict ourselves to models in physics (Hartmann 1995, p. 52; 
Nersessian 2008, p. 12). Such a definition is, however, not necessary and one can 
content oneself, as Nersessian proposes, with a loose definition that is sufficient to 
capture the way physicists think of models.
2
 
From the most general point of view, a model can be conceived as an abstract im-
aginary system of interrelated parts that has as a whole certain distinguishing charac-
teristics. The most important characteristics of models are (1) their functional design, 
                                                          
1  There are numerous examples of this cross-fertilization. Some of the more spectacular ex-
amples are the so-called genetic algorithms in Artificial Intelligence, which are based on 
natural evolution models (e.g. Goldberg 1989), the use of Markov chain-models to identify 
authors in philological studies (e.g. Khmelev 2000) and the use of phase transition models 
from physics for problems in social philosophy of science (e.g. De Langhe 2012). 
2  By purely focusing on the epistemological role of models, we evade at the same time the 
discussion about the ontology of models. For an introduction to the latter discussion, see 
Frigg and Hartmann 2012. 
(2) their representational potential and (3) their susceptibility to manipulation, all of 
which are uncontested in the relevant literature. Models in science are in the first 
place functional, or as Morrison and Morgan state it, they are designed or constructed 
to “function as tools or instruments” (1999, p. 11). The purpose of this design can be a 
variety of scientific activities such as theory construction, explanation, prediction, 
suggesting which data should be collected, etc.
3
 The main reason why models can 
function as a tool for all these purposes is their second property: they are meant to 
represent certain features of the world, or as Nersessian explains it, “they are designed 
to be structural, functional or behavioral analogues of their target phenomena” (2008, 
p. 12). Finally, the reason why models can be considered as tools is their susceptibil-
ity to manipulation, and as such they distinguish themselves from mere representative 
descriptions. The design of a model is such that one can interact mentally with the 
model by manipulating certain features, adjusting certain parameters or adding or 
removing certain parts, all of which represent interventions in the target field (Morri-
son and Morgan 1999, p. 12).
4
  
With this characterization in mind, we can explain how models play their role in 
the three heuristic activities identified in the introduction. When a scientist is con-
fronted with a new target phenomenon, i.e. a collection of experimental data, she can 
try to structure this data by constructing a model. She does not have to start this ac-
tivity from scratch. Generally, some initial constraints are available from a general 
theory or some related models. For example, if a researcher tries to construct a model 
for a particular type of nuclear reactions, initial constraints are raised by her model of 
nuclear constitution and some general theories such as quantum mechanics. Still, it is 
obvious that there are no clear algorithms at this stage, but that this is more a matter 
of skill. In the literature, this activity has been described as constructing with bits 
from different sources (Morgan and Morrisson 1999, p. 15-16), as matching represen-
tations to mathematical structures (Czarnocka 1995, p. 30) or as constructing a hybrid 
between target and source domain (Nersessian 2008, p. 28). The common denomina-
tor is that this activity is a bit-piece assembly process. This assumes that scientists 
have certain simple blueprints at hand, simple mathematical models and structures 
that they have acquired over the years, and which they can be combine with theory, 
experimental data and various representations. The so-called model constructing skills 
consist then in maintaining and expanding such a set of blueprints, and the application 
                                                          
3  S. Epstein (2008) distinguished seventeen different reasons why one should model. Apart 
from the most straightforward reasons prediction and explanation, he identifies models also 
as a key method to e.g. finding gaps in your data or formulating new research questions. 
While models are often constructed for several of these reasons, he convincingly argues that 
e.g. models for prediction and explanation are typically of a different nature. Not all of his 
seventeen reasons, however, should be considered as purposes for the design of a particular 
model. His paper aims mostly to convince scientists in fields where models are less com-
mon, and some of his reasons such as “teaching us a scientific outlook” are just interesting 
qualities that result from the regular use of models. 
4  Because of this feature, the use of models has received a central place in the interventionist 
view of science going back to Hacking and Cartwright (Cartwright et al., 1995). 
of this set to various problems is exactly the second heuristic practice that I have iden-
tified. 
Second, the models’ susceptibility for manipulation allows us to simulate and ex-
plore within the constraints that are imposed on the model by both its internal (for-
mal) coherency and the knowledge of the target domain. This hybrid construction 
gives the models a relative autonomy, which allow them to identify lacunas and 
anomalies in both the theory and the model itself, the first heuristic practice stated 
above.  
Now we can specify the third practice that makes models such a useful heuristic 
tool. The functional design of a model ensures that every part of the model has its 
own function. As such, if a lacuna is identified in a model, this is a functional lacuna, 
i.e. the model misses something that can fulfill a function needed by the rest of the 
model. Researchers can try to come up with own and original ideas to fill these gaps, 
but, as the case study exemplifies, it is also very common that a researcher browses 
her own field for ideas that have the necessary properties. This is a different activity 
than the use of various models from other fields. Where in the latter activity the ab-
stract structure of the model is borrowed and completed by adjusting the representa-
tional elements to objects in the field the researcher is working in, the researcher ac-
tively pursues in the former activity ideas from her own field that were proposed for 
different purposes or problems, some of which might have already become obsolete. 
To sum up, I have identified three scientific heuristic practices involving models, 
which explain why the use of model is heuristically so successful. First, models allow 
by their partly formal nature to be applied to many problems that can be situated in 
other fields, or shed at least some initial light on these problems. Second, they allow 
for dynamic simulation on the basis of which researchers can explore the various 
combinations of the model’s parameters. Third, because of their functional design 
they invite scientists to actively reconsider old ideas in order to spot an idea that has 
the right characteristics to fulfill a particular function in the grand design of the mod-
el.  
In order to apply these concepts to the case study, I will first expand on the two 
types of models that will be discussed in the case study, i.e. constitution models and 
reaction/process models. Constitution models are the oldest type of physical models 
and relate to ancient philosophical questions about the nature of things. The main 
purposes of these models are explanatory: by specifying the various parts and the total 
structure of the target phenomenon, one aims to explain certain properties of the 
whole, such as its stability or fluidity. As process and reaction models started to 
emerge only since the scientific revolution, they are much younger types of models. 
Their main purpose was not so much to explain the nature of the represented changes, 
but rather to explicate the necessary conditions and the results to be expected. Exper-
imentalists used them as a guide line to manipulate and control physical reality. In 
other words, these types of models are designed for prediction and not for explana-
tion. The scientific revolution and these experimental models put at the same time 
more stringent conditions on the older constitution models: they had to become com-
patible with (most of) the process and reaction models of the target phenomenon and 
their descriptions had to be limited to qualities that are in principle testable. There-
fore, constitution models in physics are generally limited to describing the various 
subentities and specifying the forces or mechanistic properties that keep them togeth-
er. Still, their main purpose remains explanatory as they are not strictly needed for 
prediction. 
Both types of models are – as all models are – dynamic by nature and allow the 
scientist to interact with their various parts. For constitution models, these dynamics 
lie mostly in the possibility to explore what combinations of subentities can possibly 
exist. To discuss the dynamics, I need to distinguish between process and reaction 
models. I view reaction models as models that take the represented change to occur 
instantaneously, e.g. models for radioactive decay or chemical reactions. In contrast 
with process models, which represent a gradual or stage-based change of the target 
phenomenon, reaction models represent only the situation before and afterwards, 
considering the change as something that has happened at a certain time in between. 
The main goal of these models is to specify, apart from the conditions under which 
the reaction can take place, which characteristics and entities are conserved and how 
the non-conserved properties change. Their main dynamics lies in the fact that one 
can mentally explore various situations to picture what the result of the reaction 
would be. Process models, which do not occur in the case study, draw the attention 
more to the change of the target phenomenon itself, and enable scientists to simulate 
various scenarios how they might control or accommodate the process. 
By ascribing different purposes to these different types of models, while still as-
suming their compatibility, I take models to be more or less autonomous but related to 
each other. The autonomy of the models’ purposes is also one of the reasons why 
Morgan and Morrison (1999) consider models to be independent from physical theo-
ries. The other reason is that models are also constructed more or less autonomously 
from theory or as Cartwright (1999) states it: “Theories do not provide us with algo-
rithms for the construction of models, they are not vending machines into which one 
can insert a problem and a model pops out”. This relative autonomy will also help us 
to understand the role of theories such as quantum mechanics and classical electrody-
namics in the case study. The semantic view (in which theories are superfluous fami-
lies of models) and syntactic view (in which the logically structured theory carries all 
scientific value) are both too restricted to capture how theories and models function in 
the endeavors of scientists.
5
 Cartwright (1983) has described the laws in a theory as 
“schemata that need to be concretized and filled in with the details of a specific situa-
tion, which is a task that is accomplished by a model”, and such initially under sche-
mata constructed models can develop their own dynamics, which might lead to the 
suggestion to withdraw a certain aspect of the theory (see e.g. Bohr’s suggestion to 
withdraw the energy conservation theorem (Gauderis 2013)). 
                                                          
5  See Frigg and Hartmann (2012) for an excellent summary of these two points of view. 
3 Introduction to the Case Study 
The case study in this article is Pauli’s original suggestion of a particle that was 
called the neutrino by Fermi in 1933. In Gauderis 2013, in which I discussed the vari-
ous proposed hypotheses to solve the anomalous β-spectrum in the late 1920s, I have 
argued that Pauli’s idea of the neutrino was basically an adaptation of the old idea of 
the neutron suggested by Rutherford in 1920. In this article I take on the challenge to 
explicate how this adaptation should be understood in terms of the characteristics of 
models. The case study naturally falls apart in two parts. I will first take the time to 
explain Rutherford’s project around 1920 and show how the idea of the neutron 
emerged from his model. Next, I will present the other case, which was the complete-
ly different puzzle of the curious β-spectrum. I will restrict myself however to Pauli’s 
suggestion, and show how the model he had in mind led him to think that the neutron 
might be the solution.  
4 Rutherford’s Idea of the Neutron 
Rutherford suggested the idea of the neutron for the first time in his Bakerian lec-
ture (1920). The main reason why he believed this idea to be valuable was because he 
thought that its existence “seems almost necessary to explain the building up of the 
nuclei of heavy elements” (p. 397). Translated to our conceptual framework, Ruther-
ford perceived an incompatibility between his constitution model of atomic nuclei and 
the theory of classical electromagnetism, because the laws of the latter do not allow 
the building up of the more heavy nuclei. This had led him to investigate further the 
constitution of nuclei, partly by real-life experiment, partly by mental simulation of 
the model and logical thinking. It was exactly this simulation of various possibilities 
that convinced him that there might possibly exist a neutron, although his perception 
of it was totally different than our current understanding. The fact that this idea, 
yielded by simulation of the model, could fill the functional gap in the model con-
vinced him of the soundness of this idea, a conviction that inspired him to look tena-
ciously for experimental proof over the next ten years. Finally, in 1932, his close col-
laborator Chadwick managed to assemble sufficient evidence to confirm its official 
discovery.  
Let us first explain Rutherford’s nuclear model. Like many of his contemporaries, 
he believed that the nucleus consisted out of “electrons and positively charged bod-
ies” such as helium and hydrogen nuclei (p. 377). But, as he had already suggested in 
1914, all these positively charged bodies can ultimately be considered as a combina-
tion of positively charged hydrogen or H-nuclei (which became gradually called posi-
tive electrons or protons) and negatively charged electrons,
6
 kept together by the elec-
                                                          
6  Hanson (1963, p. 157-59) explains the fact that for a long time scientists refused to consider 
any other elementary particle besides protons and electrons by pointing to the fact that these 
two particles were at the same time considered to be the elementary subunits of the two 
types of electrical charge. As there was no other type of electricity, there was no reason to 
presuppose another elementary particle. 
tromagnetic force
7
 (Pais 1986, p. 230; Rutherford 1920, p. 395). For example, the He-
nucleus or α-particle was considered to be a very stable combination of four H-nuclei 
and two electrons. This so-called proton-electron or p-e model explained convincing-
ly the atomic mass and charge of the various elements. A nucleus with atomic mass A 
and charge Z consisted of A protons (which all have, as they are hydrogen nuclei, 
elementary mass, and, hence, add up to the atomic mass A) and A-Z electrons (which 
made sure that the total charge of the nucleus was positive Z). The Coulomb force 
between these positive and negative particles caused the nucleus’ stability.8 
Given the common ontology of these days, this was the only viable model availa-
ble. Still, this model had several difficulties.
9
 As Rutherford mentions, the apparent 
lack of magnetic moment of the intranuclear electrons hints that these electrons must 
be somewhat “deformed” (p. 378) and that they are in no sense comparable to the 
extranuclear electrons orbiting around the nucleus. But his main problem was the 
constitution of large nuclei. As soon as a nucleus contained a certain amount of pro-
tons, the combined repelling Coulomb force of these would be just too large to ever 
let another proton come close enough to swallow it. The reason why he was so vividly 
aware of this problem, was because he observed it on a daily basis in his experiments. 
While he found it possible to shoot lighter elements with α-particles or He-nuclei, and 
initiate a collision, he found it impossible to penetrate larger nuclei due to their high 
electrostatic repulsive forces.
10
 This also nicely illustrates that Rutherford perceived 
experimental data, models and theories all as more or less autonomous entities that 
should be made compatible with each other. 
Rutherford thought he could cope with these problems by assuming certain sub-
structures in the nucleus. Nuclei were not just a heap of protons and electrons that 
attract all of each other more or less equally. He thought that protons and electrons 
bound in small stable substructures, which in turn grouped together to form the full 
nucleus. The reason why he (and the physics community in general) had this idea was 
the remarkable stability of the α-particle. In experiments it turned out to be impossible 
to break up this element by collisions (1920, p. 379). It was also observed as an inde-
pendent structure in α-decay, which led several people to assume that it was as such 
part of the nucleus. Around 1920, it was Rutherford’s main experimental program to 
find more stable combinations like this to complete the nuclear constitution model. 
                                                          
7  The only two forces known at the time were gravity and electromagnetism, but, because 
gravity is too weak to play a role at such a small scale, the only viable option was electro-
magnetism. 
8  Notice the contrast with our present day views, in which we take a nucleus to consist of Z 
protons (accounting for the nuclear charge) and A-Z neutrons (adding the total mass up to 
A), kept together by the residual strong force. For example, it is now thought that the He-
nucleus consists of 2 protons and 2 neutrons instead of 4 protons and 2 electrons. 
9  At this point, I only mention problems that were already known in 1920. The more famous 
problems for this p-e model, such as the wrong statistics of the nitrogen nucleus and the 
Klein paradox, arose only during the 1920s. 
10  It was exactly because part of the α-particles were repelled from the gold foil in the famous 
Rutherford-Mardsen-Geiger experiments that Rutherford inferred the existence of the nucle-
us in the first place. 
Because he was not able to reach the nucleus of heavier elements with α-particles, he 
conducted mainly experiments on lighter elements (nitrogen, oxygen, carbon) in order 
to produce collisions and study the remaining parts. His first discovery were H-nuclei 
or protons. This was important because, although it was generally assumed that pro-
tons existed independently in the nucleus, it was “the first time that evidence has been 
obtained that hydrogen is one of the components of the nitrogen nucleus.” (p. 385), 
and that, hence, the p-e model had some experimental ground. Second, he discovered 
a certain atom, which he called X, with atomic mass 3 and nuclear charge 2, which 
made it “reasonable to suppose that atoms of mass 3 are constituents of the structure 
of the nuclei of the atoms of both oxygen and nitrogen.” (p. 391)  
In order to figure out the substructure of this atom X, he reasoned that “from the 
analogy with the He-nucleus, we may expect the nucleus of the new atom to consist 
of three H-nuclei and one electron.” (p. 396), which made this atom a snug fit in the 
p-e model. But when he realized that this means that a single intranuclear electron can 
bind three protons,
11
  it appeared to him “very likely that one electron can also bind 
two H-nuclei and possibly also one H-nucleus” (p. 396). In other words, by mentally 
exploring what is also reasonable to expect according to the p-e model, he came to the 
idea of a close binding of one proton and one electron, an “atom of mass 1 and zero 
nucleus charge”. He expected this combination, which he started to call the neutron 
later, to be a very stable entity with “very novel properties”. Because there would 
hardly be any electromagnetic field associated with this neutral combination, it would 
be able to travel rather freely through matter. Therefore, it might reach the nucleus of 
heavy atoms without suffering from a repelling force, where “it may either unite with 
the nucleus or be disintegrated by its intense field” (p. 396). 
The thought process of how Rutherford came to the idea of the neutron is highly 
intriguing, because hardly any part of it is still acceptable according to our present 
standards: the p-e model is plainly wrong; later experiments did not confirm the exist-
ence of the X-atom; the whole idea that there exist certain substructures in the nucleus 
is flawed; the constitution of heavy nuclei poses no problems; and above all, accord-
ing to our present understanding, it is absolutely untrue to consider a neutron as a 
combination of a proton and an electron.
12
 Still, judged in light of Rutherford’s back-
ground knowledge, his thought process is a very sane and sound piece of reasoning in 
which he improved his constitution model by combining experimental data with men-
tal simulation of his model. And, although Pais claims that this whole search program 
for atomic substructure has left no mark on physics (1986, p. 231), I have shown that 
this program has led to a valuable idea, which is not only the forerunner of our current 
neutron, but also, as I will show in the next section, of our current neutrino. 
                                                          
11  A single intranuclear electron was not yet observed beforehand, hydrogen had according to 
the p-e model no intranuclear electrons, while the next element in the periodic table, helium, 
had already two. 
12  The idea that neutrons were not close combinations of protons and electrons took some time 
to settle. When Heisenberg published in 1932 the first elaborate proton-neutron model of the 
nucleus, he left the question still open. 
5 Pauli’s Idea of the Neutrino 
Pauli’s suggestion was an attempt to answer a very complex experimental puzzle, 
which had been intriguing the physics community for several years. In 1927, Ellis and 
Wooster had published an experiment that convincingly showed that the electrons in 
radioactive β-decay were emitted with a broad and continuous range of energies. This 
puzzling fact did not only break the analogy with α-decay, in which the energy of the 
emitted α-particles was determined for each possible α-decay, it also triggered some 
very counterintuitive hypotheses. For example, Rutherford and Chadwick suggested 
that not all nuclei of a particular β-unstable element were identical, because they had 
different internal energies, and Bohr suggested that energy is not conserved in β-
decay such that the electrons can escape with a wide range of different energies.
13
 At 
the time, this puzzle was  not the only problem for nuclear research. The experiments 
performed in 1926 that showed that nitrogen nuclei behaved according to Bose-
Einstein statistics, proved another serious anomaly for nuclear theory and the p-e 
model. According to latter, nitrogen (with atomic mass 14 and nuclear charge 7) con-
sisted out of 14 protons and 7 electrons, and should, hence, have a half-integer total 
spin, because both protons and electrons have spin ½. This means that, according to 
the p-e model, nitrogen nuclei should behave according to Fermi-Dirac statistics. The 
observed Bose-Einstein statistics, however, required that the nucleus consisted of an 
even number of half-integer particles, adding up to an integer total, which is required 
to explain these statistics. 
Pauli was introduced to these problems in 1929 by Bohr, who was thinking about a 
restriction of the principle of energy conservation to solve these issues, an idea that 
gave Pauli “very little satisfaction” (according to a letter to Bohr reprinted in Peierls 
1986, p. 5). As Bohr and his collaborators continued this path of energy non-
conservation, Pauli started, apart from continuously criticizing them, thinking about 
another idea, which he formulated for the first time in December 1930. Let us first, as 
we did with Rutherford, try to understand Pauli’s view on and models of the matter. 
We can then explain how he adapted Rutherford’s idea for his own purposes. 
Like all of his contemporaries, Pauli saw radioactive decay in terms of a reaction 
model in which an unstable nucleus (the situation before) decayed spontaneously into 
a remnant nucleus and the observed emitted α- or β-particle plus some γ-radiation (the 
situation afterwards). For α-particles, the model of this reaction preserves both energy 
and electric charge, but for β-decay, the unexplainable continuity of energies in the 
situation afterwards had led some to suppose that this continuity already existed in the 
situation beforehand (Rutherford and Chadwick), or to suggest to retract the energy 
conservation constraint for this model (Bohr). It was this final suggestion that trig-
gered Pauli to address this problem. To understand why he was so opposed to Bohr’s 
ideas, we have to look at some of his criticisms. In a letter to Klein, a close collabora-
tor of Bohr, he challenges Bohr’s suggestion to retain charge conservation but aban-
don energy conservation in β-decay by the following thought experiment: 
                                                          
13  For an extensive exploration of this puzzle and all suggested hypotheses, see Gauderis 2013. 
“Imagine a closed box in which there is radioactive β-decay.[...] If 
the energy law thus would not be valid for β-decay, the total weight of 
of the closed box would consequently change. This is in utter opposi-
tion to my sense of physics! For then it has to be assumed that even the 
the gravitational field – which is itself generated [...] by the entire box 
(including the radioactive content) – might change, whereas the electro-
static field, [...], should remain unchanged because of the conservation 
of charge.” (reprinted in Jensen 2000, p. 153) 
The heart of Pauli’s criticism is that the field formalisms for gravity and electro-
statics, both depending on inverse-square laws, are constructed analogously and, 
hence, considered to be of the same kind. By breaking this analogy, Bohr’s suggestion 
has the far reaching consequence of undermining the physical concept of a field. Un-
like most quantum theoreticians who had hardly ever to deal with gravity,
14
 Pauli was 
also an expert in the field of general relativity.
15
 Because of this, Pauli was much 
more aware of field structures as the main ontological concepts for physical reality 
than nuclear physicists in general. This explains why Bohr’s ideas were so disturbing 
for him. 
If Pauli was convinced that the conservation laws must hold in this reaction model, 
it probably occurred quite fast to him that the only way to balance the disequilibrium 
between the before and after situation was by adding something to the picture. But 
nothing else was observed so far in the β-decay experiments. Hence, he needed to 
look for something that was unobservable or at least very hard to observe. As conser-
vation of electrical charge already applied, it had to be also electrically neutral. In 
other words, his reaction model for the process of β-decay had suddenly a gap, which 
should be filled by an idea or entity which had these two properties. In an autobio-
graphical article, he wrote the following: 
 “Then I have tried to connect the problem of the spin and statistics 
of the nucleus with the other problem of the continuous β-spectrum 
without giving up the energy conservation principle through the idea of 
a neutral particle. I have sent a letter about this [...] in December 1930, 
when the heavy neutron was not yet experimentally found.” (1957, p. 
1316, my translation) 
In this letter
16
 he presented a “desperate remedy” to solve these two problems, 
namely “that there could exist electrically neutral particles in the nucleus, which I 
want to call neutrons” (1957, p. 1316, my translation). In Gauderis 2013, I have ar-
gued that this idea was largely an adaptation of Rutherford’s idea. The main argu-
ments for this thesis are, first of all, the fact that Pauli used the term “neutron” for this 
nuclear constituent, while the term “neutron” was still actively used by Rutherford 
and his collaborators in articles, a fact Pauli must have been aware of. Second, the 
fact that he points out why Rutherford had no success in finding his neutron before 
                                                          
14  The effects of gravity are far too weak to be noticeable at the atomic scale. 
15  At the age of 21, he wrote a summarizing monograph on the general theory of relativity, 
which impressed even Einstein (Pais 2000, p. 215). 
16  The original German text of this letter can be found in Pauli 1957 (p. 1316). An integral 
translation can be found in Brown 1978 (p. 27). 
1930 right before presenting his own idea hints that he thought to have found what 
Rutherford was looking for. Finally, he seems to have abandoned the idea that his 
particle was a nuclear constituent only around 1932, the year in which the “heavy” 
neutron was discovered by Chadwick. 
The functional gap in Pauli’s model was clear: he needed something that could car-
ry some spin and energy, had zero charge and was very hard to detect. At the same 
time, there was an old and well-known hypothesis of a neutral particle that is hard to 
detect. Although it had been suggested in a completely different context and was 
aimed at another purpose, its properties made it suddenly a viable candidate to fulfill 
the functional gap of another problem. As such, Pauli employed this idea in his mod-
el, calculated its further properties such as its spin and possible mass, and was able to 
put forward the first version of his attempt to solve the β-puzzle. 
6 Aftermath of the Case Study 
In 1932 Chadwick, a close collaborator of Rutherford at the Cavendish laboratory, 
announced the experimental discovery of the neutron. In his article (1932) he stated 
explicitly that what he found was the particle Rutherford envisioned in his Bakerian 
Lecture in 1920. This discovery was directly accepted by the physics community, and 
gave rise to the first proton-neutron models of the nucleus later that year, which were 
able to explain the anomalous statistics of nitrogen nuclei. Pauli’s hypothesized parti-
cle, which had, in contrast with the discovered “neutron”, a very low mass, was 
dubbed the “neutrino” by Fermi in 1933 to distinguish it from Chadwick’s discovery. 
Gradually, this solution for the anomalous β-spectrum drew more adherents until it 
was incorporated in Fermi’s model for β-decay in 1934, after which consensus fol-
lowed shortly after. Bohr himself admitted defeat in 1936. However, it took until 
1956 before experimental evidence was found for the neutrino. 
7 Conclusion 
In explaining the success of using models for heuristic purposes, the functional de-
sign of models is often left out of the picture. In this paper, I showed by means of a 
conceptual analysis and a detailed historical case that precisely this functional design 
of models forces researchers to explore vigorously old ideas in order to adapt them for 
their current purposes. As such I identified a third practice – besides the often men-
tioned mental simulation of various scenarios and wide cross-fertilization between 
different fields – that explains the heuristic success of models.  
Old ideas are often reused, generally adapted or employed as an analogy or meta-
phor. The case study in this paper explains in detail how Pauli filled the functional 
gap in his model for radioactive β-decay by adapting an old idea that figured in Ruth-
erford’s atomic constitution model. But not only entities or objects serve as ideas that 
can be adapted for new purposes; this is illustrated by Bohr’s suggestion to retract the 
energy conservation principle. At least twice before did he use this same idea to solve 
a certain puzzle, each time with a completely different purpose.
17
  
Although it is for many cases impossible without a detailed case study to tell 
whether it concerns the use of an old idea or whether one came independently to the 
same idea, there is certainly no reason to suspect that all these ideas were original. As 
such, if we want to understand how scientists use models and reuse them, it is im-
portant to be aware of how models invite scientists by their functional structure to 
actively explore old ideas in order to adapt them for their own purposes. Further case 
studies and formal analyses are, however, needed to understand the impact of this fact 
on our current methodologies. 
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